Well, I can’t promise you a future with a beachfront property in “Gaza Lago”. In fact, in the world of investing there are no guaranteed returns. As promised in our recent Private Portfolio Thoughts newsletter, I wanted to address expectations as to what long-run returns a private investor should be looking for in a portfolio of private assets. First, let’s take a look at ‘industry standard’ expectations based on global historic data compiled by research house, Pitchbook. Of course, these are just averages and no doubt are ‘skewed’ by supra-normal returns for a small number of successful funds in each asset class. However, the table below gives an approximate guide to expectations over various time horizons and types of investment.
The Spark focus is probably towards the top of this table summarising 5-year and 10-year returns for private equity (PE) and early-stage investing through venture capital (VC). However, if we strip out debt and real asset products the double-digit (%) performance picture is pretty similar across the board for private assets. The annual rates of return (IRR) implied by the performance of these private assets (in aggregate) are 13.4% over 5-years and 12.5% over 10-years.
Let’s be more conservative and suggest that portfolios of private assets after 10 years SHOULD have grown in value at a rate of 12%. In real terms (and compounding those rates of return) that equates to an initial investment of €10,000 growing to €31,000 over 10 years. For context, a fund with publicly listed equities would be expected (by financial planners) to generate 7% returns per annum and thus turn €10,000 into €19,600. Of course, the extra return earned by the private asset portfolios is the compensation required by investors for the higher risk exposure(reduced liquidity, business failure) compared to the shares of large established businesses trading every day. These return numbers (based on history) can be described as “hurdle” rates which investors are expecting to match or beat in order to justify putting their capital at risk over long periods of time. So, let’s apply some hurdles to our world of very young companies (VC) and small businesses (private equity).
We know that the industry standard in more mature private capital investment strategies is looking to turn €10,000 into something north of €30,000 over 10 years. We might describe this as an expectation to generate 3x your initial investment amount. Arguably, for higher risk investments in our earlier-stage world, investors could expect/demand an even higher return for their portfolios. If investors wanted 4x returns or €40,000 after 10 years that equates to a 15% annual return which is what private equity strategies have achieved(see table). So, that expectation is not unreasonable. But…. how realistic is it in a high risk portfolio of mainly early-stage business failure? We should touch on the key ‘push backs’ we get from investors who are wary of investing in start-up businesses or smaller private equity deals. The following are the most common perceived wisdoms….
“80-90% of start-ups fail”
“ Exits are more difficult as IPO markets for smaller companies have struggled”
“I can just buy publicly listed equities and earn similar returns”
There is an element of historic truth to all these statements but I’m going to use the most dangerous words in the investing lexicon by stating “this time it’s different”. First, the history of start-up failure should take into account the characteristics of older vintages of businesses. Let’s think about old economy businesses investing heavily in premises, equipment, overseas expansion facilities, logistics etc. These are, in most cases, “sunk costs” in capital-heavy businesses. Inevitably, if the business gets into trouble these ‘assets’ are not just worthless but can have an actual negative value due to ongoing liabilities/leases, maintenance costs, security, insurance etc. Now, think about many of today’s “asset light” businesses leveraging digital infrastructure and building value through the experience of the founders/team, the data gathered by the business and the development of relationships with clients and partners.
These businesses don’t have the same level of sunk costs/liabilities (as old economy businesses) which can swamp the value of the operational “franchise”. Instead, the value within a business which might not be meeting growth targets can be recognised by a third party and lead to another form of exit which doesn’t involve liquidation. In the Spark portfolio we have seen a number of businesses acquired by third parties in the same sector in exchange for shares in the acquiring company. These shares clearly have a value and also change the traditional calculations around start-up failure.
In the world of debt/credit one of the key financial terms/metrics is historic “recovery value”. In main street terms, this is the typical expected percentage of the debt which can be recovered when a business fails in a particular sector. You will see such sector recovery data displayed as a percentage of the debt ie 20 cents, 30 cents in the dollar. So, in the world of start-ups there is normally no debt and the equity in the business is a complete ZERO in the case of struggle or failure. But, now that’s not quite the case. If an acquiring business is offering a share exchange then the “recovery value” could by 20-50% of the original investment. And, the reason for ‘value’ being found in the business is the experience of the acquired team, the database and client relationships. This is happening on a far bigger scale elsewhere.
Ever heard of the term ‘acqui-hiring”? This refers to a situation in which a company acquires another company primarily for its talented team or employees, rather than its products, technology, or other assets. In an acqui-hire, the acquiring company may not be interested in continuing the acquired company’s business or product, but rather wants to bring the talent into its own organization. Now, here’s another bit of jargon monoxide…. ever heard of CVC? Well, you know what venture capital (VC) does but there’s a subset of the VC ecosystem called Corporate Venture Capital(CVC). This form of VC funding is in reality larger corporations investing in smaller businesses whose franchises/technology could ultimately be relevant and value-creating for the parent company.
So, you might think Sequoia, Index Ventures, Tiger Global and Andreessen Horowitz are the kings of VC investing. Now, think again. Amazon, Google, Microsoft and Nvidia are hugely active in the VC funding space. As an illustration, Nvidia deployed $1 billion in 50 VC funding rounds in 2024 alone. Furthermore, Google has acquired a whopping 222 start-ups over the years, and in 2023 the “Magnificent 7” tech stocks participated in 208 VC deals. So, the IPO market might not be as start-up friendly as in the past but Big Tech certainly is stepping up to the plate as a new and highly active exit event option.
Of course, there will always be those investors who believe they can earn approximately similar returns to private asset strategies by choosing a selection of publicly listed companies. Yep, the likes of Domino’s Pizza, Paddy Power, Apple and Nvidia tick those boxes but there’s also an assumption investors will avoid the temptation of selling while on the multi-decade rocket ride. However, the more significant point is about business failure. Think it’s only start-ups? Sixty years ago the average life-span of a company in the S&P 500 was over 50 years. Today, it’s less than 15 years! By 2027, almost 75% of companies who were quoted in the S&P 500 in 2016 will have disappeared (Source: McKinsey). Not for the first time, I’d suggest it’s worth a read of the excellent The Future is Faster Than You Think to grasp how fast business and technology leadership is changing.
We can’t forecast the future. However, we should recognise that the world of start-ups today has changed dramatically. As a final illustration, start-up funding was traditionally populated by a majority of consumer-focused businesses – think retail, textiles, manufacturing, food, fashion etc. The term “B2C” would be used to describe these business-to-consumer companies. Well, that’s changed too. Certainly, for Spark. A whopping 70% of funding deals completed by Spark have been business-to-business (B2B) opportunities. It should also be noted that our vetting process turns away approximately nine in every ten opportunities. Arguably, we are selecting the top decile of quality in the opportunity universe. No doubt we will get it wrong along the way, but this is still a robust risk starting point. And, it’s not the only starting point…
The purpose of this article is to set the scene for a follow-up piece on how these structural shifts can impact the average private portfolio and future expectations using sample portfolios and outcomes. But always remember…. if I could truly forecast the future, “Gaza Lago” might personally have an entirely different meaning and location.
